Prospects And Challenges Of A Yemeni Ground Offensive Against Houthis

SANA’A, YEMEN – MAY 2: Yemeni security guards look on during a mass protest against U.S. airstrikes ... More and in solidarity with people in the Gaza Strip on May 2, 2025, in Sana’a, Yemen. The US has continued an airstrike campaign, Operation Rough Rider, targeting Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebel group, following negotiations between the Trump administration and Tehran over Iran’s nuclear program. (Photo by Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images) President Trump’s air campaign against the Houthis in Yemen has led rival Yemeni factions in the country to mull seizing a potential opportunity to launch a ground offensive against their adversary. Whether an offensive will materialize in the coming weeks and months or prove capable of wresting any significant territory from the group remains to be seen. The anti-Houthi groups hope to uproot the Houthis from strongholds along the Red Sea coast, including the port of Hodeidah, and have already received advice from private American security contractors, according to an April 14 Wall Street Journal report . Trump ordered extensive airstrikes against the Houthis on March 15, targeting its military infrastructure and leadership. Yemeni groups hope this air campaign will enable them to mount an offensive while their adversary is under heavy bombardment. U.S. airstrikes have hit over 800 suspected Houthi-related targets in the six weeks since Trump launched this campaign, the US military announced on April 27. Alex Almeida, a security analyst at the energy consultancy Horizon Engage who has conducted fieldwork in Yemen, believes there is “little hard evidence” in the short term that any offensive has moved beyond mere talk or initial planning. “That said, there does seem to be some real momentum within the ROYG (Republic of Yemen Government) for a renewed offensive, as well as increased cooperation among the key military players in the Presidential Leadership Council, which is a notable shift,” Almeida told me. “The combat effectiveness of the anti-Houthi forces varies significantly – some groups like the Salafi Giants brigades are combat-proven fighters that can deploy and fight anywhere in Yemen,” Almeida said. “But large sections of the frontline are held by local tribal or semi-tribal Yemeni army forces that have dubious offensive value.” The analyst believes the key question is whether American airstrikes and any other support to anti-Houthi forces could “offset the absence” of ground forces from the United Arab Emirates. Emirati forces previously played a key role in past offensives against the Houthis in 2015-2018. The Journal report stated that the UAE raised the ground offensive plan with US officials. However, the Emirates has since denied reports of its involvement, as has Saudi Arabia, which previously led an anti-Houthi coalition and carried out a large-scale air campaign against the group from 2015 to 2022. Mohammed Al-Basha of the Basha Report, a Virginia-based Risk Advisory, believes the likelihood of ground operations resuming in Yemen is “moderate to high,” especially along the country’s western coast. However, he clarified that these operations would more likely be “a defensive response to Houthi mobilization” than “a UAE- or US-backed” initiative. “The Houthis currently view Vice President Tariq Saleh’s National Resistance Forces as their primary adversary in that region,” Al-Basha told me. “The broader anti-Houthi coalition is fragmented, consisting of eight smaller armed groups with conflicting ideologies and competing visions for Yemen’s future. Their infighting and absence of unified command and control have allowed the Houthis to consolidate power and expand.” While the United States shares these group’s goals of combating the Houthis and degrading its capabilities, it may not provide extensive direct support for any ground offensive. Any support would most likely be limited to providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to anti-Houthi militias and perhaps some precision airstrikes in support of any offensives they manage to mount. “The Trump administration remains cautious about deeper military entanglements, especially in protracted conflicts like Yemen,” Al-Basha said. “However, securing the Red Sea coastline aligns with core US national security interests, particularly in protecting commercial and naval freedom of navigation — a principle the Houthis have challenged repeatedly since their first attack on a US Navy vessel in 2016.” “Recapturing parts of the coast would disrupt Houthi supply chains, smuggling routes, and launch sites for UAVs and missiles while also undermining their political leverage in any future peace talks.” Developments in the wider Middle East could ultimately influence events on the ground in Yemen. The Houthis threatened to resume their attacks on international shipping in March as the brief ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, a Houthi ally, in the Gaza Strip broke down. Additionally, the US is presently engaged in nuclear talks with the primary state backer of the Houthis, Iran. “A lot will depend on how US-Iran talks play out and how the Gaza war develops during the coming weeks and months,” Almeida of Horizon Engage said. “A U.S.-Iran deal or another ceasefire in Gaza would likely cause Trump to lose interest in Yemen and take any anti-Houthi offensive off the table.” “On the other hand, if U.S.-Iran negotiations stall or break down, we could see the Trump administration ramp up US support for the ROYG forces as a way to pressure Iran and the Houthis.” A fourth round of U.S.-Iran was scheduled for Saturday in Oman but was postponed “for logistical reasons,” the Sultanate’s foreign minister announced on X. Regardless of the outcome of the Gaza war and the Iran nuclear talks, it appears Saudi Arabia and the UAE have little appetite for another confrontation with the Houthis, especially since their relations with Iran have markedly improved in recent years. “The UAE has been busy putting down several new airfields in Yemen that could, in theory, be used to logistically sustain a renewed ROYG ground offensive, but it’s also unclear whether Abu Dhabi would be willing to reengage, even with U.S. backing,” Almeida said. While Trump’s air campaign against the Houthis is the most intense American one yet, it may not inflict lasting blows against the group without a concurrent ground offensive that captures and holds territory. Al-Basha noted that without ground operations, the Houthis would likely have “space to regroup, rearm, and sustain future attacks” against its leadership and weapons. “Just recently in Jordan, a two-man cell using Chinese machinery was able to manufacture 300 short-range rockets — now imagine what the Houthis are capable of, given they control 80% of Yemen’s population and over a quarter of its territory,” Al-Basha said. While there are limits to what airstrikes alone can achieve, the present US air campaign ordered by Trump just over a month ago has already demonstrated it can achieve things it predecessors throughout the past decade could not. “Unlike the Saudi-led coalition, which faced significant constraints from the international community, today’s global consensus is shifting against the Houthis,” Al-Basha said. “Moreover, U.S.-supported operations are more capable of minimizing civilian casualties and collateral damage, in contrast to the widely criticized Saudi-UAE air campaign.” Source: https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2025/05/03/prospects-and-challenges-of-a-yemeni-ground-offensive-against-houthis/