$19 Billion USDT Inflow: Expansion of Illegal Guarantee Networks in Southeast Asia

From January 2021 to April 2026, over $19 billion USDT has been analyzed to have flowed into illegal cryptocurrency trading guarantee platforms in Southeast Asia. These platforms facilitated transactions related to gambling, money laundering, fraud, and human trafficking, based on Telegram communities and Tether (USDT), providing payment and dispute resolution services.

Blockchain analytics firm BitTrace reported that it tracked deposit addresses of more than 100 illegal trading guarantee platforms, revealing a cumulative inflow exceeding $19 billion USDT. The annual inflow showed an increasing trend, peaking in 2025.

Unlike typical smart contract-based escrows, trading guarantee platforms operate based on the reputation of the operating entity and the deposited funds. After gathering trading parties in a private Telegram group, the seller or intermediary sends the deposit, and the funds are returned after the transaction is completed.

The platform charges a guarantee fee and handles transaction reporting, advertising, customer acquisition, and dispute resolution. The structure differs from smart contract-based escrows in that the operating entity manages trust and settlement between trading parties.

BitTrace categorized transaction types into private group transactions, public group transactions, and transactions that switch from public to private groups. Public groups are rented monthly by illegal operators for advertising and customer recruitment, with transaction details reported via Telegram bots.

In high-value areas like human trafficking, a conversion-type transaction that charges a per-transaction guarantee fee is utilized. After recruiting trading counterparts in a public group, the process moves to a private group for guarantee procedures.

Payments primarily used Tether issued on the Tron (TRX) and Ethereum (ETH) networks. BitTrace analyzed that some guarantee platforms not only connected the deposit and withdrawal channels of gambling sites with third-party cryptocurrency payment services but also operated gambling communities and payment tools directly.

From May 2025 to April 2026, BitTrace reported that payment tools related to Xinbi Guarantee, Dali Guarantee, and Pulilai Guarantee received over $4.8 billion USDT. However, the actual scope of criminal involvement and the final use of funds for each platform may vary based on individual addresses and transaction flows.

The market share of Xinbi Guarantee was recorded at 92.48%. This figure is limited to the illegal trading guarantee market defined by BitTrace and its monitoring targets, and does not represent the total illegal market size in Southeast Asia.

The UK government identified Xinbi as a major illegal online market in Southeast Asia in March 2026 and imposed sanctions. The UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office stated that Xinbi provided cryptocurrency-based services to fraudulent organizations and supported the distribution of stolen personal data and satellite communication equipment.

The UK sanctions list also included Tron addresses linked to Xinbi. The designation of sanctions could lead to authorities blocking the flow of funds associated with the platform.

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) under the US Treasury reported that the Cambodia-based Huiyuan Group laundered at least $4 billion (approximately 53.72 trillion KRW) in illegal funds from August 2021 to January 2025. This figure is a separate tally targeting the Huiyuan Group.

Previously, BitTrace analyzed that $3.4 billion USDT flowed into Southeast Asian fraud networks in the first half of 2026, but this figure differs in analysis, counting period, and address scope from the current analysis. Therefore, the inflow growth rate or market expansion cannot be calculated using both figures. The previous BitTrace analysis presented the division of labor structure of illegal trading guarantee platforms.

BitTrace analyzed that even if a specific platform is shut down, the entire criminal ecosystem does not disappear. Public groups, payment tools, and gambling sites are loosely connected, so if one platform is blocked, transactions can shift to another guarantee platform.

Tether's on-chain freeze measures also influence the flow of funds. BitTrace reported that on September 8, 2026, Tether froze 50 blockchain addresses, including more than 21 operational addresses related to Xinbi Guarantee.

The scale of the freeze was $45 million (approximately 60.4 billion KRW). This figure is based on BitTrace's on-chain address tracking, and the name of the law enforcement agency that issued the freeze has not been confirmed.

This analysis shows that Tether can be utilized as an operational base connecting community recruitment, transaction guarantees, dispute resolution, and money laundering, beyond being a payment method for illegal transactions. However, the $19 billion USDT and the 92.48% market share of Xinbi Guarantee are analytical figures based on BitTrace's tracking scope.